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Concerns shaping policy and 
research
Admission policies to schools over the 
past two decades have been designed 
to serve a variety of purposes and re-
search into those policies has sought 
answers to a variety of questions.
There is an enduring concern about the fair-
ness of admissions. It is the case that higher 
performing schools are attended more often by 
children from richer families while poorer chil-
dren are more likely to attend a school that is 
performing less well. One interpretation of this 
is that the admission system is not ensuring 
that each parent has an equal opportunity to 
gain access to the best schools, which in turn 
leads to their lower attainment and restricted 
social mobility (see Forewords by Sir Peter 
Lampl in Cribb et al, 2013).
Policy, regulation and campaigning have 
therefore been aimed at helping poorer parents 
to gain better access. Research has sought to 
monitor how far the intakes of schools differ 
and whether some types of schools are more 
socially segregated than others, and to identify 
causes.
A concern for fairness overlaps with a con-
cern to ensure the efficiency of procedures 
such that the admission system optimally 
matches parents’ preferences with places 
available and better ensures equality of oppor-
tunity for parents to gain their most preferred 
school. The greater diversity and opportunity to 
choose has made the process of admissions 
more complex for parents and administrators 
and in the early years of implementation there 
was considerable inefficiency (Audit Commis-
sion, 1996) with the process being complex 
and unpredictable for parents. Research has 
sought to address the issue of design, moni-
tor the proportion of parents gaining their pre-
ferred school and gauge the level of parental 
satisfaction.
Another concern has been with the effective-
ness of the admissions system in facilitating 
policy aims. Successive governments have 
been committed to the introduction of market 
relations between schools and parents as a 
way of improving the education system. One 
purpose of the regulation and legislation on ad-
missions has therefore been to establish and 
maintain effective market relations. It has, for 
example, reduced the power of local authori-
ties (LAs) in relation to education in their local 
area, required schools to provide adequate in-
formation about their performance and admis-
sion arrangements, allowed different providers 
of schools, allowed popular schools to expand 
and threatened failing schools with closure. 
Research has attempted to find how far opti-
mum market conditions exist, what criteria par-
ents use and whether system performance has 
been affected. A critical strand of this research 
has looked at unintended effects.
Another focus of concern is the danger to 
the stability and cohesiveness of communities 
when children from different religious or cultur-
al backgrounds are educated separately. Faith 
schools are a historical feature of the English 
system where the Roman Catholic Church and 
the Church of England have provided schools 
for members of their religious communities 
and there have been a very small number of 
Jewish schools (Allen and West, 2009). There 
have recently been added a small proportion 
of schools for other faiths. In addition, because 
immigrants from the same part of the world 
tend to cluster for a period in the same areas of 
cities, non-faith schools can have a large pro-
portion of children from a particular religious 
community. The concern is that this exacer-
bates tensions between different social groups 
and fuels social unrest.
The regulation of admissions
In 1998, the new Labour government passed 
the School Standards and Framework Act, es-
tablishing a new legal framework for school ad-
missions, which, amended and strengthened 
by subsequent acts, remains the foundation of 
current official practices.
The Secretary of State is required to issue 
codes of practice on admission arrangements, 
the latest of which came into force in December 
2014. The evolving codes have been powerful 
instruments for governing admissions prac-
tices. Admission authorities (AAs) (including 
academy trusts) and LAs must comply with (not 
just have regard to) the codes. The Office of 
the Schools Adjudicator (OSA) makes binding 
adjudications on objections, receives reports 
from LAs and occasionally conducts research 
on relevant topics.
England now has one of the most highly 
regulated admission systems (for comparison 
see the Matching in Practice in Europe web-
site, www.matching-in-practice.eu/). In addition 
• Admission policy serves a variety of 
purposes and therefore research has 
sought answers to various questions – 
about fairness, efficiency, policy aims 
and segregation.
• Strong regulation needs to continue.
• Parents do not choose on the basis 
of educational attainment alone – 
competition for parental custom on 
academic criteria does not act as an 
effective driver of system improve-
ment.
• Evidence from different perspectives 
suggests that the aim of policy should 
be to achieve more balanced intakes 
to schools.
• There is increasing disruption at 
ground level of the regulatory regime 
due to the reduction in the role of LAs 
and an increase in the number of own 
admission authority schools.
• Policy makers and campaigners 
should resist simplistic conclusions 
that the unfairness of admissions 
is a market dysfunction that can be 
tweaked, or is the result of a lack of 
access to “good” schools, or middle 
class monopolisation of high perform-
ing institutions, and make policy in 
full acknowledgement of the complex 
dynamics of parental choice, social 
solidarity and schools’ responses to 
accountability; school segregation is a 
symptom of inequality rather than its 
cause.
• How children get allocated to 
schools is an aspect of the role that 
schooling plays in our society reflect-
ing moral and political visions of how 
education contributes to achieving an 
ordered, prosperous and cohesive 
society.
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to improved efficiency and procedural fairness, 
there is evidence that the regulatory framework 
has marginally contributed to less segregated 
schooling (Allen et al, 2012). For an explana-
tion of the current process of admissions see 
the 2014 Code (DfE, 2014).
The revisions to the codes in 2012 and 2014 
have, in contrast to previous revisions, weak-
ened rather than strengthened regulation with 
some previously outlawed oversubscription 
criteria rehabilitated, responsibility for in-year 
admissions removed from LAs and admission 
forums becoming discretionary. There is little 
evidence as to how effective the admissions 
forums have been but Noden and West (2009), 
on the basis of five case studies in different 
LAs, found that the forums fulfilled one or more 
of five roles: a leadership role, a symbolic role, 
a scrutiny role, a perfunctory role and an expert 
role. They also noted the lack of formal pow-
ers. The forums have been retained by 65 LAs 
(43%) (OSA, 2014).
The weakening of regulation coincides with 
a policy to make schools independent of the 
LA and therefore an increasing proportion of 
schools being their own admissions authority. 
A consistent theme of OSA Annual Reports and 
research (West and Hind, 2003; Coldron et al, 
2008; Sutton Trust, 2013) is that schools that 
are their own AA are more likely to be non-com-
pliant with the codes – a greater proportion of 
them do not publish their admission arrange-
ments in time, have unnecessarily complex cri-
teria and are reluctant to accept children who 
are difficult to place in line with their local Fair 
Access Protocol (FAP). In addition, because 
the LA no longer co-ordinates in-year admis-
sions, these schools have more opportunities 
to reject in-year applications and delay alerting 
the LA. The number of in-year admissions is 
not small. During 2011–12, there was a total of 
300,000 in-year admissions and for every 10 
pupils who moved from primary to secondary 
school in September 2011, another six moved 
schools during that school year (Rodda et al, 
2013).
It is too early to reach any conclusions about 
the effect on admissions of the academisation 
programme (but see Morris, 2014 and Noden 
et al, 2014). Meanwhile the evidence suggests 
increasing disruption at ground level of the reg-
ulatory regime due to the reduction in the role 
of LAs.
Parents’ satisfaction with the 
process and outcome
Parents are able to express a preference for at 
least three state-funded schools in any area. 
The school’s AA must rank applications in order 
against its published criteria and send the list of 
eligible applicants back to the LA, which then 
allocates each child to its highest preference 
school at which a place is available and for 
which the child is eligible. Parents receive that 
one offer from the LA on the same day as all 
other parents across the country. Parents have 
the right of appeal to an independent panel.
The great majority of parents get the school 
they want and say they are satisfied with the 
process and outcome of the admissions pro-
cess (Coldron et al, 2008; Burgess et al, 2011). 
The percentage is significantly lower in more 
densely populated areas (only 72% of parents 
in London gained their first choice of secondary 
school).
Most parents have a real choice of between 
three and five schools and are satisfied with the 
choice of schools in their locality. Parents from 
all social backgrounds have a similar number 
of schools to choose from but the number var-
ies with more schools available in urban and 
fewer in rural areas.
Significantly, no association is found be-
tween parents getting their first choice school 
and their socio-economic status, education 
level, or the level of deprivation of their neigh-
bourhood.
Continuing concerns about 
segregation
These reasonably high levels of satisfaction 
coexist with evidence that social segregation 
persists and that richer children disproportion-
ately attend higher performing schools. In 2013 
the Sutton Trust found that the overall propor-
tion of pupils eligible for free school meals at 
the 500 highest performing comprehensives 
was 7.6%, compared to the average of 16.5% 
for all other state schools.
Schools vary in the proportion of children 
they have on free school meals compared 
with the proportion in their neighbourhood. 
Community schools are least segregated on 
this measure whereas faith schools (Voluntary 
Aided) and converter academies tend to have 
more socially advantaged intakes (Pennell et 
al, 2007; Allen and West, 2011; Sutton Trust, 
2013).
Converter academies have an average FSM 
proportion of 7.3% compared to an average of 
16.5% across all schools. The 163 remaining 
grammar schools are also populated dispro-
portionately by children from more affluent 
families (Atkinson and Gregg, 2004). Cribb et 
al (2013) report that although 18% of pupils 
in selective areas are eligible for free school 
meals the grammar schools in those areas 
have only 3% and that poorer children with the 
same ability are less likely to attend a grammar 
school than their richer peers.
In selective LAs, 66% of children who 
achieve level 5 in both English and Maths at 
Key Stage 2 who are not eligible for free school 
meals go to a grammar school compared with 
40% of similarly high achieving children who 
are eligible for free school meals.
Social segregation is greatest where there 
is structural and religious diversity between 
schools, where there are more schools that are 
their own admissions authority and where the 
area is wholly selective (Burgess et al, 2014 
and 2011). There is no strong correlation be-
tween marketisation and the national level of 
social segregation (Gorard et al, 2013) but the 
determinants of the kind of segregation and po-
larisation between schools in an area are to be 
found in the local context (Allen and Vignoles, 
2007; Harris, R. and Johnston, R., 2008). Dif-
ferent kinds of segregation – ethnic, religious, 
English as a second language (ESL), Special 
Educational Needs (SEN) – have different pat-
terns and their determinants are likely to vary 
(Gorard et al, 2013).
Why do richer parents appear to gain 
privileged access to high performing schools? 
One explanation is residential segregation. 
Poorer parents cannot afford to move into 
affluent neighbourhoods, which tend also to 
have higher performing schools. Most schools 
use proximity as a criterion of admission (Noden 
et al, 2014), which means richer parents have 
higher performing schools as realistic choices 
while poorer parents have poorer performing 
schools (Burgess et al, 2011; Allen, Burgess 
and Key, 2010).
To mitigate this “selection by mortgage” the 
Education and Inspections Act 2006 extended 
rights to free home-to-school transport for chil-
dren from low income families. To my knowl-
edge there has been no research into the inde-
pendent effectiveness of this initiative.
Independent of residential factors, richer par-
ents can better afford to pay for private tuition 
that enhances their children’s chances of per-
forming well in selective examinations (Ireson, 
2004) and extra transport costs to higher per-
forming but more distant schools are less likely 
to constrain their range of choice.
A second explanation is that poorer and 
richer parents have different educational pref-
erences and are actively choosing different 
schools. When parents are asked to rank their 
criteria of choice, invariably they cite multiple 
criteria. But when asked to name the most 
important they most often cite proximity, their 
child’s preference, the academic performance 
of the school or an older sibling attending (Flat-
ley et al, 2001).
Each single criterion is most often cited by 
a minority and never by more than a small 
majority. But more affluent and more educat-
ed parents tend to cite academic criteria more 
often than poorer parents (Leroux, G., 2015) 
and this is borne out by studies of actual choic-
es (Burgess et al, 2014). Burgess et al (2009, 
2011 and 2014) have tried to disentangle how 
far different socio-economic groups of parents 
prioritise different criteria and how far they are 
responding realistically to their chances of 
gaining entry to certain schools.
They found that both play a role. Parents in 
the lowest socio-economic status (SES) quin-
tile have fewer high performing primary schools 
realistically available to them, but also, when 
both groups of parents share the same set of 
feasible schools, richer parents tend to choose 
higher performing schools while a proportion 
of poorer parents choose lower performing 
schools.
Another explanation is that poorer parents 
engage less successfully with the admissions 
system because they do not, or are less able 
to, access sufficient information and lack com-
petence at managing the complex criteria 
and process. The Education and Skills Select 
Committee (2004) takes this line and it was 
the rationale for the Choice Advice initiative 
(which had little effect on segregation (Stiell 
et al, 2008; Exley, 2013)) and for more recent 
recommendations to enhance information (Le-
roux, 2015). The assumption of such a deficit 
is not well supported by the evidence (Coldron 
et al, 2010).
In addition there is the possibility of covert 
social selection by schools. English schools 
are largely, and still fairly crudely, held account-
able by government and government agencies 
for the performance of their pupils in public ex-
aminations.
Schools are also well aware of how parents 
perceive the other children who would be their 
child’s peers and the residential areas from 
which they come. It is therefore in the school’s 
interests to attract children with high prior at-
tainment and from more affluent families. But 
direct evidence of the scale of covert selection 
is difficult to come by.
Prior to the introduction of the 2003 codes 
many nominally comprehensive schools, and 
particularly those that were also faith schools 
and their own AA, had arrangements that en-
abled them to select on social or educational 
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grounds (Flatley et al, 2001; West and Hind, 
2003) but we do not know what proportion of 
them did so. Enforced compliance with the 
codes since 2006 has meant that schools have 
had very little room (legally) to manoeuvre. But 
objections on these grounds make up a signifi-
cant part of the workload of the OSA each year. 
The OSA has also expressed concern (echo-
ing that of LAs) that the appeals process of 
schools that are their own admissions authority 
is difficult to monitor.
However, a robust and well conducted re-
view of schools in all 150 LAs in 2006 by the 
OSA found that breaches of the admissions 
code, although widespread, tended to be of a 
minor technical kind and were easily amended 
(OSA 2008). A high degree of compliance con-
tinues to date (Noden et al, 2014). However, 
some schools do not co-operate fully with FAPs 
and resist the in-year admission of vulnerable 
children (OSA 2014). The evidence suggests 
that, although active covert selection makes an 
unknown contribution to the overall sorting of 
pupils and that schools’ ability to manipulate 
their intakes through illegal admission arrange-
ments is limited, continued strong regulation is 
necessary.
There is little academic research into how 
many parents are fraudulently claiming to live 
near to their preferred oversubscribed school. 
The OSA was asked in 2009 to investigate the 
scale of the problem, how it might affect the 
fairness of admissions and whether the current 
sanctions were sufficient to deter. It conclud-
ed that, although 46.3% of the 123 LAs that 
responded to the OSA survey reported that 
fraudulent applications were a problem in their 
area, the vast majority of parents “play by the 
rules”.
However, most of the LA respondents 
thought that more was going on than came 
to their notice (OSA 2008-09 Annual Report). 
The current Chief Adjudicator asked all LAs 
to report on fraudulent applications in 2013-
14. They reported a similar small incidence of 
known cases.
One lesson we may draw from this evidence 
is that, although middle class parents tend to 
engage more anxiously and energetically with 
the process of choosing (beginning the pro-
cess sooner and accessing more information), 
the idea that schools and most middle class 
parents are fiddling the system in illegitimate 
ways is probably overblown and diverts atten-
tion from the more significant fact that, for the 
majority of parents with multiple advantages 
(social, financial, educational, residential) and 
schools that have affluent catchment areas or 
select by attainment, the task of advantageous 
selection is already achieved legitimately.
A body of work (Lareau, 2011; Reay, 2007; 
Crozier et al, 2008) suggests that middle class 
parents act in a variety of ways to ensure that 
their children are well educated, which means 
with children like themselves (Ball, 2003). Mid-
dle class solidarity, together with the difference 
in financial resources, operates powerfully to 
maintain educational and residential separa-
tion. However, a focus on middle class stra-
tegic behaviour minimises the fact that acting 
in response to the need to be with people like 
oneself is shared by parents from all strata of 
society and, as already noted, a proportion of 
poorer parents also seek separation.
Evaluations of policy initiatives
One of the most significant policy initiatives has 
been the regulation of admissions through the 
codes. In addition to improved efficiency and 
procedural fairness there is evidence that the 
regulatory framework has marginally contrib-
uted to less segregated schooling (Allen et al, 
2012).
In 2006-7 LAs were required to focus as 
much on fairness of outcomes as on fair pro-
cedures. They should actively promote equity 
rather than simply ensuring that unfair practic-
es and criteria are excluded (Para 1.67, 2007 
Code).
To monitor the effect of this potentially rev-
olutionary initiative LAs were required to re-
port annually to the OSA on the fairness and 
legality of the admission arrangements for all 
schools in their area (Para 1.8, 2007 Code). In 
the event the change had almost no effect. The 
potentially significant concern for outcomes 
is now reduced to the mandatory minimum of 
reporting on how admissions work for looked 
after children and those with SEN, the propor-
tion of parents making appeals and the effec-
tiveness of the FAPs (Para 3.23, 2014 Code).
Pupil premium
The pupil premium was introduced in 2010 
whereby a school receives more money for 
each child registered for free school meals. 
While funding formulae already provided extra 
resources for children on free school meals the 
pupil premium increased these and was highly 
publicised.
This has three potential effects relevant to 
admissions. The extra resources provided to 
schools in more challenging circumstances 
might enhance their exam performance and 
thereby reduce the performance difference due 
to more and less advantaged intakes. It might 
reduce the motivation for schools to select out 
poorer children. And, if schools became less 
socially segregated and more similar in aca-
demic performance, there might be less moti-
vation on the part of middle class parents to 
segregate. It is too early to tell what effects the 
initiative will have.
Fair banding
Fair banding eliminates differences of ability/
attainment between the intakes of schools in 
the banding arrangement and, because ability/
attainment is significantly correlated with so-
cio-economic groupings, significantly reduces 
social segregation (Coldron et al, 2008).
It is likely to improve educational results 
overall and significantly reduce performance 
differences between schools. In so doing it 
potentially mitigates the local hierarchy of 
schools, making local schools more acceptable 
to parents.
Some secondary schools use fair banding 
but it is currently only a small minority. A recent 
report by the Sutton Trust (Noden et al, 2014) 
found that 121 out of more than 3,000 second-
ary schools in 2012-13 were using banding, 
an increase from 98 in 2008. They are more 
often found in London and academies and 
free schools are more likely to use banding. 
Banding is easier to apply in densely popu-
lated urban areas and more difficult across 
a large area with geographically dispersed 
schools without increasing travel costs for par-
ents and LAs. Also, some applicants may be 
forced away from their preferred school if the 
band they are eligible for is full. Fair banding is 
necessarily incompatible with an area-wide se-
lective system and even the existence of some 
selective schools in an area would reduce the 
desegregating effect. While banding is not a 
panacea (Noden et al, 2014) it can contribute 
significantly to creating more balanced intakes.
Ballots
Random allocation can now be used as an 
over-subscription criterion. It guards against 
covert discrimination and can mitigate selec-
tion by mortgage. Only a minority of AAs use 
it, most often as a tie breaker. It was used as 
a main ranking criterion by only 42 schools in 
2012 (Noden et al, 2014).
The early evidence from an application in 
England is equivocal as to its effects on social 
and ability segregation because ballots were 
used in complex interplay with catchments (Al-
len et al, 2010).
Conclusion
This review has dealt only with admissions 
up to the age of 16, although there is growing 
concern about admissions beyond that phase. 
Strong regulation has worked in the past to pro-
vide an efficient and procedurally fair process 
of allocation that restricts the room for schools 
and their AAs to manipulate their intakes. The 
continuing strong incentives for schools to ad-
mit children of higher prior attainment and from 
more affluent families means there is a continu-
ing need for strong regulation.
The policy of freeing schools from LA control 
has been given impetus through the acade-
misation programme since 2010. This means 
that more schools are becoming their own 
admissions authority enabling them to alter 
catchment areas and (for secondary schools) 
to prioritise applications from certain primary 
schools. Further, removing the duty for LAs 
to co-ordinate in-year admissions has made 
it more difficult to place these (usually more 
vulnerable) children as efficiently and quickly 
as they used to be. Close monitoring of how 
admissions are working across a local area will 
be needed.
Strong regulation and fair procedures do not 
ensure that poorer children are more likely to 
attend higher performing schools. The contin-
ued social segregation of schooling is a result 
of the fact that the schools available to poorer 
parents tend to perform less well but also that 
they are more likely actively to choose these 
schools and more affluent parents to choose 
others.
Segregated schooling has deep roots in 
English history, social structures, cultures and 
behaviour (Simon, 1999). It is not a simple 
matter of poorer children being denied access 
to good schools. It is also about solidarity of 
social groups to which one belongs or aspires 
(Coldron et al, 2010). The religious and cultural 
segregation that is also a concern may largely 
be explained by the same need for solidari-
ty. These facts are also likely to continue to 
confound the attempt to improve the system 
through greater competition.
Policy makers and campaigners should re-
sist simplistic conclusions that the unfairness of 
admissions is a market dysfunction that can be 
tweaked, or is the result of a lack of access to 
“good” schools, or middle class monopolisation 
of high performing institutions and make policy 
in full acknowledgement of the complex dy-
namics of parental choice, social solidarity and 
schools’ responses to accountability; school 
This is the fifth in a series of RISE 
Reviews. Previous reviews looked at 
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of Ofsted inspections and the effect 
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school performance.
They are available free from 
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segregation is a symptom of inequality rather 
than its cause. While it is important to draw at-
tention to the stark facts of separation, to seek 
mitigation through changes to admission policy 
is unlikely to have any significant effect without 
addressing wider social inequalities.
Admissions is not just a technical matter. The 
way in which children get allocated to schools 
is a key aspect of the role that schooling plays 
in our society. Debates about admission poli-
cies, while appearing to be about arcane tech-
nicalities, reflect rival moral and political visions 
of how the education system contributes to 
achieving an ordered, prosperous and cohe-
sive society.
The evidence can be interpreted from rad-
ically different perspectives and lead to such 
different policy conclusions as, on the one 
hand, that we need to make the education mar-
ket work more effectively by educating poorer 
parents to be more discriminating consumers 
and eradicating restrictive practices and, on 
the other, that we need to balance all intakes 
so as to reduce the non-educational differenc-
es between schools and foster inclusive school 
communities for reasons other than a discredit-
ed and narrow notion of attainment.
Attendance to the evidence is unlikely to be 
the determining factor in policy making given 
these differences of social vision. It is of con-
siderable interest then that, for different rea-
sons, there is a convergence of informed opin-
ion that the aim of policy should be to achieve 
much more balanced intakes.
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